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Abstract 
We use a natural experiment to show that the presence of an external examiner has both a direct and 
an indirect negative effect on the performance of monitored classes in standardized educational tests. 
The direct effect is the difference in the test performance between classes of the same school with and 
without external examiners. The indirect effect is the difference in performance between un-
monitored classes in schools with an external examiner and un-monitored classes in schools without 
external monitoring. We find that the overall effect of having an external examiner in the class is to 
reduce the proportion of correct answers by 5.5 to 8.5% - depending on the grade and the test - with 
respect to classes in schools with no external monitor. The direct and indirect effects range between 
4.3 and 6.6% and between 1.2 and 1.9% respectively. Using additional supporting evidence, we argue 
that the negative impact of the presence of an external examiner on measured test scores is due to 
reduced cheating (by students and/or teachers) rather than to the negative effects of anxiety or 
distraction from having a stranger in the class.  
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 3 
1. Introduction 
 
A problem with test – based accountability systems in education is that they generate incentives for 
teachers, students and school administrators to “game” the system in order to obtain better results. 
The manipulation of test outcomes generates efficiency losses both when these outcomes are used 
to allocate resources to schools and teachers and when – more modestly – they provide valuable 
benchmarking information which can affect the choices of schools and their stakeholders.  
     One mechanism for inflating test scores is outright cheating. Empirical analysis of cheating 
behaviour is scarce
1
. In their influential study, Jacob and Levitt (2003) develop an algorithm for 
detecting teachers’ cheating that combines information on unexpected test score fluctuations and 
suspicious patterns of answers for students in a class. They find that a small fraction of Chicago 
teachers responded to accountability pressures by completing student examinations in an attempt to 
improve outcomes.  
     A possible deterrent of forms of cheating that may occur during the test – e.g. students copying 
from one another or teachers communicating the correct answers – or during the scoring – e.g. 
teachers changing students’ answers or filling in missing answers – is monitoring by external 
examiners. External monitoring has costs and benefits. Costs increase with the desired level of 
coverage. Benefits depend both on the efficiency gain associated to a reduction in cheating and on 
how effective monitoring is in influencing test scores and reducing cheating.  
     In this paper, we estimate the impact of external monitoring on test scores, using a rather unique 
natural experiment designed by the Italian central test administrator (INVALSI), which assigned 
external examiners to randomly selected classes and schools with the task of monitoring students 
taking the test and reporting results
2
. We compare test outcomes in the classes with an external 
examiner with the outcomes in other classes, where the test was administered by a local teacher, 
and find that the rate of correct answers is lower in the former than in the latter. Using additional 
supporting evidence, we argue that the negative impact of the presence of an external examiner on 
measured test scores is due to reduced cheating (by students and/or teachers) rather than to the 
negative effects of anxiety or distraction from having a stranger in the class. 
     Our study contributes to the literature on school accountability in two main directions. First, we 
show that the introduction of external examiners has a significant effect on measured test scores in 
an environment where there are incentives to manipulate results. Second, we document that the 
                                                        
1
 See Figlio and Loeb, 2011, for a review of the recent literature. 
2
 These tests are taken by the universe of primary second and fifth grade students. INVALSI 
sampled a number of classes and schools for external monitoring to obtain reliable data, speed up 
data collection and verification and prepare an annual report on the state of primary education in 
Italy.  
 4 
monitoring effects of having an external examiner spill over to un-monitored classes of the same 
school. We decompose the overall effect of external monitoring - which we measure as the 
difference in the average rate of correct answers in monitored classes and in classes of un-
monitored schools - into a direct and an indirect effect. The direct effect is the difference in the test 
performance between classes with and without external examiners belonging to schools selected for 
external monitoring. The indirect effect is instead the difference in performance between un-
monitored classes in a school with an external examiner and un-monitored classes in schools 
without external examiners.  
     We estimate that having an external examiner reduces the percentage of correct answers by 3.6 
to 5.4 percentage points - depending on the grade and the test - which corresponds to 5.5 to 8.5% of 
the average score in classes belonging to schools with no external examiner. The estimated direct 
effect ranges from 2.8 to 4.2 percentage points (4.3 to 6.6%), and the residual indirect effect from 
0.8 to 1.2 percentage points (1.2 to 1.9%). We discuss two alternative reasons why the effects of 
monitoring spread from the monitored class to the other classes in the same school. The first is that 
the presence of an external examiner in the school acts as a disciplinary device also on students and 
teachers in other classes of the same school because of the fear that the examiner may roam about. 
The second is that teachers dislike excessive dispersion in average class scores within the same 
school, because of the conflicts it could generate.       
     We find that the estimated overall effect of external supervision is significantly higher in the 
schools located in Southern Italy than in Northern schools and in schools where class size is smaller 
and the proportion of tenured teachers is higher. We show that territorial differences are associated 
to differences in social capital, even after controlling for territorial differences in GDP per capita 
and unemployment rates. 
     Studying the Italian experience with external monitoring has both advantages and disadvantages. 
The key advantage is that the random allocation of examiners to schools and classes allows us to 
bypass the selection problems that typically plague the evaluation of monitoring effects. A potential 
disadvantage is that in the Italian context there is limited accountability of schools and teachers. In 
this environment, the incentives to cheat may be weaker than in high-stakes contexts. In this case, 
our estimates can be interpreted as lower bounds of the effect of external monitoring in contexts 
where the incentives to manipulate results are stronger.    
     The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the relevant literature and Section 3 
describes the design of the INVALSI test and the dataset. The empirical strategy is presented in 
Section 4. The main empirical results, a few robustness checks and extensions are reported in 
Section 5, 6 and 7, respectively. Conclusions follow. 
 5 
2. Review of the literature  
 
Aside from outright cheating studied by Jacob and Levitt (2003), the literature has identified several 
indirect ways that teachers and school administrators can use to manipulate student results. On the 
one hand, Jacob (2005), Figlio (2006), Figlio and Getzler (2006), Cullen and Reback (2006) and 
Hussain (2012) investigate whether schools engage in strategic manipulation of the composition of 
the pool of tested students by excluding low ability students, either by reclassifying them as 
disabled or by strategically using grade retention and disciplinary suspensions. On the other hand, 
Figlio and Winicki (2005) show that during testing periods some schools increase the caloric intake 
provided by school cafeterias so as to boost students’ performance. Attempts to increase test scores 
by taking psycho-stimulant drugs are documented for the US by Bokhari and Schneider (2011), 
who show that the diagnosis of “attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder” is more frequent in states 
where there are stronger accountability laws.  
     To our knowledge, we are the first in this literature to investigate both the direct and the indirect 
effects of external examiners as deterrents of cheating in standardized tests.  That indirect treatment 
effects can occur has been already pointed out by a broader literature. Heckman, Lalonde and Smith 
(1999), for instance, discuss how policy effects may spread to those not directly participating in the 
programme mainly because of general equilibrium or spill-over effects. Miguel and Kremer (2004) 
evaluate both direct and external effects of a Kenyan programme aimed at treating intestinal worms 
infection among primary school kids. In a similar fashion, Angelucci and De Giorgi (2009) evaluate 
the effects of Progresa, a Mexican aid programme based on cash transfers, and stress the 
importance of estimating indirect treatment effects on the ineligibles when there are social 
interactions between eligible and ineligible individuals.  
 
 
3. The Design of INVALSI Servizio Nazionale di Valutazione (SNV) Tests and 
the Data 
 
INVALSI
3
 standardized tests in Italian and Math were introduced in Italian primary schools in 
2008
4
 to evaluate school productivity. The purposes of the evaluation
5
 are to inform the central 
                                                        
3
 INVALSI is the National Institute for the Evaluation of the Education System, in charge of the 
design and administration of standardized education tests in Italy. 
4
 See Law n.147 – 2007, and Ministry of Education and Research Decree n.74 and 76 – 2009. 
 6 
government about the general performance of the school system, and to offer schools a standardised 
reference to self-assess their strengths and weaknesses, using a value added approach. These tests 
are not formally high-stakes, because the allocation of resources to schools, the salary of teachers 
and the school career of students do not explicitly depend on test outcomes. Even so, pressure to 
perform well in the tests has been high because of the widespread expectations that they might be 
used at some point to evaluate teachers and schools. These expectations were fostered by the 
Ministry of Education, who in an intervention at the Lower House of the Italian Parliament (June 
10
th
 2008) when the tests were introduced, made explicit reference to the need to establish within a 
few years a system of evaluation and incentives for teachers and schools based on student 
performance in the tests. Schools have an incentive to perform well also because results affect their 
reputation. Although the outcomes of the tests are not made public by INVALSI, schools have 
access to the results of their own students and can disclose them to parents and other stakeholders, 
in an effort to build their reputation and attract good students
6
.  
     Since 2008 the tests have been administered every year. In this paper, we focus on the 2010 
wave because of its peculiar design features. First, this wave was the first to test and collect data for 
the entire population of Italian primary school students in their second and fifth grade. Second, and 
most important for our purposes, in 2,000 randomly selected classes - out of a population of about 
30,000 - the test was administered in the presence of an external examiner
7
, who had two main 
tasks: a) be present in the class during the test and monitor its correct implementation; b) report 
student answers on the dedicated answer sheets and transmit them to INVALSI. In the other classes, 
the test was administered by teachers of the school (but not of the class and not in the subject 
tested), and reporting was done jointly with the teacher of the class. We use the random selection of 
classes as a natural experiment to estimate the effects of external monitoring on test outcomes. 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
5
 See article 2 of the INVALSI statute (Ministry of Education and Research Decree n. 11-2011) and 
the Ministry of Education and Research Directive n. 88-2011. 
6
 “INVALSI does not provide public rankings of schools based on the outcomes of the test. The 
main purpose of the tests is to provide each single school and its stakeholders with valuable 
information that can help them to benchmark and improve their performance. Each school is free to 
advertise its own results, using the tools provided by the Ministry of  Education…” (free translation 
by the authors of Ricci and Sestito, 2012). 
7
 External examiners were selected by INVALSI and the Regional Schooling Authorities mainly 
among retired teachers and active teachers employed in non-primary schools. Each examiner was 
paid 200 euro per working day. Details on the criteria adopted to select external examiners are 
reported in the Appendix. 
 
 7 
     Classes assigned to external monitoring were sampled using the same two-stage sampling 
scheme adopted by the IEA TIMSS survey, with stratification by region
8
. In the first stage, a pre-
determined number of schools in each region were randomly selected by probabilistic sampling, 
with probability of inclusion proportional to school size, measured by the total number of students 
enrolled in the tested grades (second and fifth). In the second stage, and depending on school size, 
one or two classes for each tested grade within each treated school were selected by simple random 
sampling
9
. In each selected class, the test was administered in the presence of an external examiner. 
Table 1 shows for each grade the total and sampled number of primary schools, classes and pupils: 
about 18% of all primary schools and close to 7% of all classes and pupils in the second and fifth 
grade were selected to have an external examiner during the test.  
     We have access to the records containing the individual answers to the questions of the test taken 
in 2010 by students in classes with and without external monitoring, as they were transmitted to 
INVALSI by teachers and external examiners
10
. For each student, we also have information - 
provided by school offices - on her marks in Italian and Math during the semester before the test 
and on parental background. We add to these data the results of a  questionnaire administered by 
INVALSI exclusively to fifth graders in order to collect additional information both on parental 
background and on student feelings and motivation during the tests. Finally, we have obtained from 
INVALSI additional information on school and class characteristics, including the number of 
students enrolled in each class and in each school for each tested grade, the proportion of tenured 
teachers in each school and, only for fifth grade students, an index of individual economic, social 
and cultural status (ESCS)
 11
. 
                                                        
8
 Region Valle d’Aosta and the Province of Bolzano autonomously decided to have all classes 
assigned to external monitoring. For this reason, we exclude them from our analysis. Our 
management of the data from the original to the final dataset is described in the Appendix.  
9
 The average number of classes per school in sampled schools is 5.3, with a standard deviation of 
1.9. Further details on the sampling procedure are reported in the Appendix. 
10
 All questions were either multiple choice or open questions with a univocally correct answer, and 
were coded by INVALSI as correct, incorrect or missing. 
11
 Available information includes the following variables: 1) at the school level: whether the school 
offers a full time schedule; 2) at the class level: class size measured both as the number of students 
enrolled in the class and as the number of students who were present at the test, full or part-time 
schedule (measured in term of the schedule of the median student in the class, to avoid 
measurement errors); 3) at the individual level: gender, place of birth, citizenship, attendance of 
pre-primary school, age, employment, education and nationality of parents. For fifth grade students 
only we have information on: whether the student at home has own bedroom, internet access, an 
encyclopaedia, own desk, a computer and a place for doing homework, the number of books in the 
house, the number of siblings, whether she lives with both parents or not, the language spoken at 
home, whether she gets help with her homework or not. 
 8 
     We test for successful randomization by checking whether observables are balanced between 
sampled and non-sampled schools and classes. Reflecting the sampling strategy adopted by 
INVALSI, we verify balancing in two steps, first between sampled and non-sampled schools and 
second between sampled and non-sampled classes within the set of sampled schools. Since 
sampling is stratified by region and sampling probabilities depend on school size, our balancing 
tests are conditional on regional effects, school size and, in the second step, the number of classes in 
the school. Although we have data for second and fifth graders, we focus hereinafter on the latter 
for brevity. Selected results for second graders are shown in the Appendix. 
     For each variable X in Table 2 we first test between – school balancing by running  
 
jrjrjj RSRDtX         (1) 
 
where the subscript r is for the region where the school is located, Xj is the average value of X in 
school j, tj is a dummy taking the value 1 if school j has been sampled and 0 otherwise, rRD is the 
full set of regional dummies, rjRS  
is school size interacted with regional dummies and j  is the 
error term.   
     Next, we test within-schools balancing by running  
 
 ijrjijij vRtX          (2) 
 
where  Xij is the average value of X in the class i of school j, tij is a dummy that indicates whether 
class i in school j has been sampled and ],,[ rjrjjrj RCRSRDR   is a vector which includes the 
controls used in equation (1) as well as rjRC , the number of fifth (or second) grade classes in 
school j interacted with regional dummies. We estimate equation (2) only for the classes belonging 
to the schools with external examiners and, since the second stage randomization took place within 
each school, we add school fixed effects and cluster standard errors at the school level. 
     Table 3 reports the point estimates of the β and δ coefficients in (1) and (2) and their statistical 
significance. Since balancing is not attained for the number of students enrolled in a class, which is 
greater among treated classes, we include this variable as a covariate in all our regressions. Turning 
to individual variables, although for some covariates we detect statistically significant differences 
across the various groups, the point estimates show that these differences are very close to zero in 
 9 
almost all cases. Prudentially, we add these variables as covariates in our regressions to eliminate 
the risk of unbalancing and to increase precision
12
.  
 
 
4. Identification and Estimation 
      
We define the following three potential outcomes at the class level: Y00 if the class was assigned to 
a school with no external observer (an untreated class in an untreated school), Y11 in case of direct 
monitoring (a treated class in a treated school) and Y01 if the class was not monitored by an external 
examiner but belonged to a school where at least one other class was monitored (an untreated class 
in a treated school). By design, all classes of untreated schools are un-monitored.  
     Let the dummy variable Sj take the value one if school j has been assigned to school-level 
treatment (and zero otherwise) and the dummy Ci take value one if class i has been assigned to 
class-level treatment (and zero otherwise). The observed outcome Yij for class i in school j can be 
represented in terms of potential outcomes as follows: 
 

Yij  (1 S j )Y0 0 S jCiY1 1 S j (1Ci)Y0 1      (3) 
 
We are interested in the identification and estimation of a) the average direct effect of monitoring 
E[Y11-Y01]; b) the average indirect effect of monitoring E[Y01-Y00]; c) the average overall effect of 
monitoring E[Y11-Y00], where E[.] is the mean operator.  
     The sampling procedure described in Section 3 is characterized by conditional randomization, 
which implies that a) in each region, the assignment to school - level treatment is random, 
conditional on the size of the school, measured by the number of students enrolled in the second 
and fifth grade; b) the assignment to class - level treatment for a class of a given grade in a treated 
school is random conditional on the size of the school, measured both by the number of students 
enrolled in the second and fifth grade and by the number of classes in the selected grade. 
Conditional randomization in each grade implies that 
 

Y0 0,  Y0 1,  Y1 1  S j ,  Ci |R       (4) 
 
                                                        
12
 We notice  that the proportion of missing data is slightly smaller in sampled schools and classes. 
This might be due to a more careful reporting of administrative information by secretaries in the 
schools and classes assigned to external monitoring. 
 10 
When (4) holds, the average direct, indirect and overall effects of external monitoring are given by  
 
],1,0|[],1,1|[]|[ 0111 RSCYERSCYERYYE jii jjii j    (5) 
],0,0|[],1,0|[]|[ 0001 RSCYERSCYERYYE jii jjii j    
(6) 
],0,0|[],1,1|[]|[ 0011 RSCYERSCYERYYE jii jjii j    (7) 
 
         We aggregate our data at the class level and evaluate the effects of external monitoring on 
average class performance in the Math test by estimating  
 
ijijrjjjijij uRSSCY  43210      (8) 
 
where the dependent variable is the average percentage of correct answers in the class. We allow 
errors u to be correlated among the classes of the same school and weigh each class-level 
observation with the number of students in the class. The vector   includes for all grades the 
number of students enrolled in a class, which is greater among treated classes, and the following 
covariates: type of school (public or private), full or part-time schedule, average (in the class) 
gender, place of birth, citizenship, attendance of pre-primary school, age, grades in Italian and Math 
in the previous semester, employment, education and nationality of parents, and only for the fifth 
grade the percentage (in the class) of  students who have their own bedroom, internet access, an 
encyclopaedia,  own desk, a computer and a place for doing homework, the average number of 
books in the house, the average number of siblings, the percentage of students living with both 
parents, the language spoken at home, and whether they receive help with her homework. The 
summary statistics of these covariates are in Panel A of Table 2. The direct, indirect and overall 
effect of external monitoring are given by 1 , 2 and 21   respectively. 
 
 
5. Results 
 
Table 4 shows our baseline estimates of Eq. (8). Standard errors in this and the next tables are 
clustered at the school level. The first column in the table considers all Italian regions, and the 
remaining columns show the estimates by macro area (North, Centre and South). We find that 
having an external examiner in the class reduces the percentage of correct answers by 3.59 
percentage points, which corresponds to a 5.5 percent decline with respect to the mean score in 
 11 
untreated schools
13
. Close to 80 percent (2.79/3.59) of this total effect is direct, and the remaining 
20 percent (0.81/3.59) is indirect. The size of the total, direct and indirect effects varies with the 
macro area and is highest in Southern regions, where the total effect is  -8.9%, and lowest in 
Northern Italy, where it is -2.6%. 
     Why are test results worse in classes with the external examiner? One possibility is that young 
students under-perform because they are distracted by the presence of a stranger in the class and are 
more anxious that students in un-monitored classes. The other possibility is that either students or 
teachers in classes without the external examiner engage in outright cheating
14
. We believe that the 
second one is the explanation, for the following reasons.  
     First, there is no evidence that students in classes with the external examiner are negatively 
affected in their feelings and motivation to complete the test properly. In a questionnaire filled up 
by fifth graders participating to the test in classes with and without the external examiner, INVALSI 
asked a set of motivational questions aimed at capturing the psychological status of students during 
the test, which included agreement or disagreement with the following sentences: a) I was already 
anxious before starting the test; b) I was so nervous I couldn’t find the answers; c) while answering, 
I felt like I was doing badly; d) while answering, I was calm. Table 5 presents the results of 
estimating Eq. (8) when the dependent variable is the percentage of students in the class agreeing 
with each of the four statements above. We find no evidence that being in a class with an external 
examiner increased anxiety or nervousness. Quite the opposite, there is evidence that students in 
these classes were less nervous and calmer during the test.  
     Second, we examine the distribution of results within classes. In the absence of external controls, 
the teacher can communicate the correct answers to students or change their answers in the answer 
sheet, or students can simply copy from each other. If outright cheating by students and/or teachers 
was taking place in the classes without the external examiner, we should find that in these classes – 
ceteris paribus - the standard deviation and the coefficient of variation of test results are lower than 
in classes with the external examiner, where cheating is minimized or altogether absent. While 
                                                        
13
 As shown in Table A.2 in the Appendix, the total effect is somewhat larger for second graders 
(5.4 percentage points, or 8.5% of the average score in untreated schools). 
14
 We assume that cheating is unlikely in classes with the external examiner. On the one hand, since 
schools are informed of having been selected to receive an external examiner only about one week 
prior to the date of the test, there is little room of manoeuvre for teachers to react and adopt 
strategies that manipulate student performances in the presence of the examiner. On the other hand, 
we assume that external examiners have no incentive to cheat and collude with school teachers and 
principals in order to boost school results. In support of this assumption, INVALSI (2010a) used a 
procedure to detect cheating in monitored classes and concluded that there was no evidence of 
cheating. The cheating detection algorithm is described in INVALSI (2010b). 
 
 12 
distraction and anxiety can reduce average performance, it is not obvious that they reduce its 
variability. Table 6 shows for the entire country the effects of the presence of an external examiner 
on the within – class standard deviation and coefficient of variation of the percentage of correct 
answers, as well as on the bottom quartile, median and top quartile of the distribution of test scores 
within classes.  
     We find that in classes with the external examiner the standard deviation and the coefficient of 
variation of results are about 6% and 11% higher than in un-monitored classes. There is also 
evidence that the presence of the external examiner affects to a higher extent the performance of 
students in the lower quartile of the distribution of outcomes, in line with the expectation that 
cheating typically helps low performers, or that low performing students are those more prone to 
copy. When compared with students in untreated schools, having an external examiner reduces the 
score of these students by about 8% (-4.26/55.6). This effect is strongest for second grade students 
in Southern Italy, where if reaches a striking 18.7%
15
. 
     Third, we compute an index of heterogeneity in the pattern of answers given by students in each 
class. For each question, we use a modified version of the Herfindahl Index 
 

H 
1 sa
2
a1
A

1
1
A
.           (12) 
 
where sa is the within-class share of students who chose answer “a” in the set A of possible 
answers
16
. Index H ranges between 0 and 1, with higher values signalling a more heterogeneous 
pattern of answers to a given question. We obtain an overall measure of the heterogeneity of 
answers in the class by averaging H across all questions in the test. While we expect this measure to 
decline in classes without the external examiner in the presence of cheating, it is not clear whether it 
declines or increases if anxiety or distraction play a role. Table 7 reports the estimates of Eq. (8) 
when the dependent variable is H, and shows that heterogeneity is significantly higher in classes 
with the external examiner. We also find that, as in the case of the percentage of correct answers in 
the class, the effects of external monitoring on the heterogeneity of answers increase significantly 
moving from Northern to Southern Italy (columns (2) to (4)). 
    Finally, the correlation between test score outcomes and teacher grades in the semester before the 
tests should be lower in the presence of cheating. Using individual student data, we examine the 
                                                        
15
 Detailed results by macro area are available from the authors upon request. 
16
 We treat missing values as a separate category.  
 13 
correlation between the rank in the test and the rank in teacher grades in classes with and without 
the external examiners. In line with our expectations, we find a higher correlation for students 
taking the test in classes with the external examiner
17
.  
     While these results are suggestive of the presence of cheating, we cannot say whether cheating 
occurs because teachers change answers in their report to INVALSI, or because they suggest the 
correct answers to students in the class, or because students are given extra time or  are allowed to 
copy from each other in classes without the external examiner. Since all these cheating strategies 
generate a higher proportion of correct answers and a lower within - class dispersion of results, they 
are observationally equivalent in our data. To distinguish between some of these strategies, we 
would need to observe both the answers directly chosen by students and the answers reported by 
teachers to INVALSI. Unfortunately, we only observe the latter. We can only speculate that since in 
un-monitored classes teachers are responsible for supervision in class, collection of the tests, filling-
in of the answer sheets on the basis of  the responses given by the students and  transmission of the 
answer sheets to INVALSI, they have certainly plenty of opportunities to modify test results. 
     An interesting and novel result of our analysis is that external examiners affect performance not 
only in the class they supervise but also in other classes of the same school. This indirect effect of 
monitoring in school tests has not been detected before and deserves further explanation. One 
interpretation is that teachers administering the test in the same school where the external examiner 
is present are afraid to be monitored by this supervisor and therefore restrain their cheating 
activities. This interpretation relies on irrational behaviour, because teachers were informed before 
the test that the external examiner’s mandate was restricted to the randomly selected class.  
     An alternative explanation is that teachers dislike excessive dispersion in average test scores 
within the same school, because such dispersion could generate conflicts with other teachers. To 
illustrate, consider a school where a single class is supervised by an external examiner. If teachers 
administering the test in the other classes cheat freely, these classes will look much better than the 
supervised class, where cheating is restrained. This may generate conflicts with the teacher in 
charge of the supervised class. To reduce these conflicts, teachers in un-monitored classes may be 
induced to restrain their cheating.  
 
 
                                                        
17
 We regress the individual within-class rank in the test on the individual within-class rank in 
teacher grades and its interaction  with the presence of an external examiner and find that the 
interaction attracts a positive and statistically significant coefficient, especially in the South, where 
cheating appears to be more widespread. Detailed results are available from the authors upon 
request. 
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6. Robustness checks  
 
In this section we investigate whether our main results are robust to several sensitivity checks. First, 
since the dependent variable of our main estimates is a fraction (the percentage of correct answers 
in the class) we implement the GLM estimator proposed by Papke and Wooldridge (1996) to deal 
with fractional dependent variables. Estimated marginal effects, shown in Table A.4 in the 
Appendix, are in line with the baseline estimates in Table 4.  
     Second, we exploit the census nature of our data and the fact that we observe almost the entire 
population of students in each grade to apply a finite population correction to statistical inference. 
Results (Table A.5 in the Appendix) are qualitatively unchanged with respect to the baseline, but 
precision increases significantly.  
     Third, we drop all observable covariates not required for the implementation of conditional 
randomization
18
. Since assignment to treatment does not depend on observables, finding differences 
between the estimates that include and exclude covariates is a symptom of strategic manipulation of 
the composition of the pool of tested students. Results in Table A.6 in the Appendix do not provide 
any strong evidence in this direction. Finally, we test  for differences in absenteeism across 
treatment statuses, using as dependent variable the percentage of students absent from the test in 
each class. Again, differences in behaviour across the three groups are minimal (see Table A.7 in 
the Appendix).  
 
 
7. Extensions 
 
So far, we have allowed treatment effects to vary across the different macro areas of the country. 
Yet there might be other relevant sources of heterogeneity to be considered. In this section we do 
two things. We start by exploring what these other sources could be – without pretending to be 
exhaustive - and then examine whether regional heterogeneity is related to regional differences in 
social capital.  
     Our candidate sources of heterogeneous treatment effects are a) class size; b)  the percentage of 
tenured teachers in the school; c) an indicator of average parental background for the students in the 
class
19
. On the one hand, if student cheating is easier in larger classes, we should find that the 
                                                        
18
 We still include regional dummies, regional dummies interacted with school size and with the 
number of fifth grade classes in the school, and the number of students enrolled in the class. 
19
 Descriptive statistics for these variables are shown in Table 2 – Panel B. 
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overall effect of having an external examiner increases with class size. On the other hand, larger 
classes could increase the cost of cheating by teachers or could reduce the effectiveness of external 
supervision. In this case, the overall effect should be smaller in larger classes. Column (1) in Table 
8 presents our estimates when both the direct and the indirect effect are interacted with class size
20
. 
The evidence suggests that the overall effect of external supervision is smaller in larger classes, in 
line with the second hypothesis.  
     Column (2) in the table shows that both the direct and the overall effect of external monitoring 
are higher in schools where the percentage of tenured teachers is higher. Typically, these are senior 
teachers with very secure jobs, who are less willing to adjust their teaching style to the needs of 
standardized tests and may therefore be more likely to engage in cheating and sabotaging.  
     Column (3) examines the interactions of the overall, direct and indirect effects with ESCS, the 
indicator of the average parental background in the class. If the incentives to engage in cheating 
were higher in classes with poor parental background, perhaps because teachers wish to 
altruistically compensate their students for their unfavourable initial conditions, we should find that 
the negative effect of external supervision is higher in these classes. Yet, there is no statistical 
evidence that this is the case
21
. 
     Next, we ask whether the regional differences in the size of the effects of external monitoring are 
associated to the differences in the level of social capital
22
. Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2010) 
define social capital as civic capital, or as “...those persistent and shared beliefs and values that help 
a group overcome free rider outcomes...”(p.8). They report higher levels of social capital in 
Northern and Central Italy compared to the South.  
     We interact both the direct and the indirect effect of external monitoring with two measures of 
social capital at the provincial level taken from Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2004), the number of 
blood donations per 10,000 inhabitants in 1995 and the average electoral participation in the 
referenda held in Italy between 1946 and 1987. Since social capital is strongly correlated with local 
                                                        
20
 In this and in the following regressions the interacted variable is included also as an independent 
control. 
21
 One possible explanation is that not only teachers, but also external examiners may be induced to 
engage in compensatory behaviour. 
22
 In their seminal work, Putnam et al. (1993) links differences in the performance of local Italian 
governments to regional heterogeneity in social capital, measured in terms of local patterns of 
associationism, newspaper readership and political participation. Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales 
(2004) show that social capital is a key determinant of financial development, and Nannicini et al. 
(2012) study the impact of social capital on political accountability. Finally, Ichino and Maggi 
(2000) measure civicness in terms of shirking behaviour in the workplace and document large 
shirking differentials between Northern and Southern Italy.  
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economic conditions, as shown in Figures 1.a-1.d, we also interact both effects with provincial GDP 
per capita and unemployment rates in 2009.  
     Results are shown in Table 9
23
. Column (1) in the table reports the estimates of the baseline 
model in the sub-sample of provinces for which data on social capital are available. These estimates 
are in line with those presented in Table 4. Column (2) and (4) show the interactions of the direct, 
indirect and overall effect of external monitoring with the two selected measures of social capital 
(blood donations and turnout at referenda, measured as deviations from sample means). We find 
that both the direct and the overall effect are smaller in schools located in provinces with a higher 
social capital. These qualitative results remain when we add to the regressions the interactions with 
provincial unemployment and GDP per capita (also measured as deviations from sample means, see 
columns (3) and (5)), although the effect of social capital is smaller.  
    Starting with Putnam’s seminal contribution, several studies have suggested that Southern Italy 
has a lower endowment of “bridging” social capital, the form of social capital supportive of a more 
cohesive society and higher civicness
24
, and is richer at the same time of “bonding” social capital, 
the type of social capital which reinforces family and clan ties in competition with the market and 
overall society and which is at the roots of the so called amoral familism (in the words of Banfield, 
1958)
25
. We interpret the higher level of cheating observed in Southern Italy as the outcome of 
lower marginal costs of cheating due to lower “bridging” social capital, and/or of higher marginal 
benefits due to higher  “bonding” social capital.  
 
 
Conclusions 
 
Test-based accountability systems in education may be gamed by students, teachers and school 
administrators in order to obtain higher measured levels of performance. This paper shows that 
having an external examiner who monitors test procedures has negative effects on the measured 
performance of tested classes and schools.These results are based on a natural experiment designed 
by the Italian national test administrator (INVALSI) to monitor test procedures in a random sample 
of Italian primary school classes. We have used random assignment to treatment to estimate both 
the direct and indirect effects of external monitoring. The former is based on the comparison of 
monitored and un-monitored classes within the same school and the latter on the comparison of un-
monitored classes in schools with and without the external examiner.  
                                                        
23
 Descriptive statistics for these variables are shown in Table 2 – Panel B.  
24
 Blood donations and referenda turnout measure bridging social capital. 
25
 See Alesina and Ichino, 2009, for recent evidence. 
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     The overall effect (direct plus indirect) of external monitoring is statistically significant and 
sizeable: depending on the grade, the presence of an external examiner reduces the percentage of 
correct answers in the class by 5.5 to 8.5 percent with respect to classes in schools with no external 
monitor. External monitoring spills over to un-monitored classes of the same school, but the size of 
this beneficial effect is rather small (about 20 percent of the overall effect).  
     Using additional supporting evidence on the psychological conditions of students before and 
during the test and on the distribution of answers within classes, we have concluded that the better 
performance of classes without the external examiner is due to the manipulation of test outcomes by 
teachers and/or students, and that the performance gap between monitored and un-monitored classes 
can be interpreted as a measure of the average intensity of cheating taking place in the latter.  
     While the direct negative effect of external supervision on test performance is not surprising, the 
presence of a small but statistical significant indirect negative effect is less expected. We have 
argued that this effect can be explained either by (irrational) fear of supervision or by a model 
where rational teachers administering the tests dislike excessive dispersion of test results within the 
school.  
     We believe that our results are useful for an economic assessment of external monitoring, which 
requires the evaluation of costs and benefits. To measure benefits, we need to ascertain whether 
external monitoring reduces cheating and by how much. Needless to say, using external examiners 
is not the only deterrence tool. Alternatives include re-shuffling the questions assigned to each 
students and computer – based tests. Reshuffling questions deters students from copying but does 
not strongly prevent cheating by teachers. Computer-based testing virtually eliminates cheating by 
teachers but it is quite costly, as it requires that each student is endowed with a computer.  At the 
cost of 200 euro per workday, external examiners are rather cost-effective at reducing the 
manipulation of tests in a random sample of Italian schools. Yet, extending their use to the universe 
of tested schools seems complicated, not only because of the monetary costs involved but also 
because of the difficulty of finding enough qualified examiners.       
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TABLES AND FIGURES 
 
 
Table 1. Total and Sampled Number of Schools, Classes and Students. INVALSI SNV Test 2010 
 
Number of  
schools 
(total) 
Number of  
classes 
(total) 
Number 
of 
students 
(total) 
Number of 
sampled 
schools 
Number of 
sampled 
classes 
Number of 
sampled 
students 
Second 
Grade 
7,700 30,175 555,347 1,385 2,000 39,299 
Fifth 
Grade 
7,700 30,476 565,064 1,385 2,000 39,643 
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Table 2. Mean and Standard Deviation of Covariates - Math Tests - V Graders  
 
Panel A 
 Mean St Dev   Mean St Dev 
Gender    Mother occupation   
Missing (%) 0.01 0.10  Missing (%) 0.20 0.40 
Male (%) 0.50 0.50  Unemployed or retired (%) 0.35 0.48 
Place of birth    Employee (%) 0.31 0.46 
Missing (%) 0.04 0.20  Entrepreneur (%) 0.08 0.28 
Italy (%) 0.89 0.31  Middle manager (%) 0.06 0.23 
Citizenship    Father occupation   
Missing (%) 0.02 0.15  Missing (%) 0.22 0.41 
Italian (%) 0.89 0.32  Unemployed or retired (%) 0.04 0.19 
First generation foreigner (%) 0.05 0.22  Employee (%) 0.39 0.49 
Second generation foreigner (%) 0.04 0.20  Entrepreneur (%) 0.25 0.43 
Pre-primary school    Middle manager (%) 0.11 0.31 
Missing (%) 0.15 0.35  Mother education   
Yes (%) 0.83 0.37  Missing (%) 0.21 0.41 
Age    Primary (%) 0.39 0.49 
Missing (%) 0.01 0.10  Secondary (%) 0.29 0.45 
Older than regular (%) 0.03 0.16  Tertiary (%) 0.11 0.32 
Regular (%) 0.87 0.33  Father education   
Younger than regular (%) 0.09 0.29  Missing (%) 0.22 0.42 
Math grade in previous semester 
(range:1-10) 
   Primary (%) 0.43 0.49 
Missing (%) 0.07 0.26  Secondary (%) 0.25 0.43 
1-4 (%) 0.00 0.04  Tertiary (%) 0.10 0.30 
5 (%) 0.04 0.20  Mother nationality   
6-7 (%) 0.38 0.48  Missing (%) 0.09 0.28 
8-10 (%) 0.51 0.50  Italian (%) 0.80 0.40 
Italian grade in previous semester 
(range:1-10) 
   Father nationality   
Missing (%) 0.07 0.25  Missing(%) 0.09 0.29 
1-4 (%) 0.00 0.04  Italian (%) 0.82 0.39 
5 (%) 0.04 0.19  Private school 0.05 0.23 
6-7 (%) 0.41 0.49  Full time schedule class 0.23 0.42 
8-10 (%) 0.48 0.50  Number of students enrolled in 
class 
19.00 4.65 
Has own bedroom    Number of siblings   
Missing (%) 0.03 0.17  Missing (%) 0.02 0.15 
Yes (%) 0.55 0.50  0 (%) 0.15 0.36 
Has internet access    1 (%) 0.55 0.50 
Missing (%) 0.03 0.16  2 (%) 0.20 0.40 
Yes (%) 0.76 0.43  3 (%) 0.05 0.21 
Has an encyclopedia    4 or more (%) 0.03 0.17 
Missing (%) 0.03 0.16  Lives with   
Missing (%) 0.71 0.46  Missing (%) 0.02 0.15 
Has own desk    Both parents (%) 0.86 0.35 
Missing (%) 0.02 0.15  One parent only (%) 0.06 0.24 
Yes (%) 0.85 0.36  Both parents alternatively(%) 0.05 0.22 
Has a PC    Others (%) 0.01 0.08 
Missing (%) 0.03 0.16  Language spoken at home   
Yes (%) 0.75 0.43  Missing (%) 0.04 0.21 
Has a place for homework    Italian (%) 0.73 0.44 
Missing (%) 0.03 0.16  Dialect (%) 0.15 0.36 
Yes (%) 0.84 0.37  Other (%) 0.07 0.25 
Number of books at home    Help with homework   
Missing (%) 0.04 0.20  Missing (%) 0.07 0.26 
0-10 (%) 0.12 0.33  No homework (%) 0.01 0.07 
11-25 (%) 0.25 0.43  No help needed (%) 0.20 0.40 
26-100 (%) 0.31 0.46  Parents (%) 0.45 0.50 
101-200 (%) 0.15 0.36  Siblings (%) 0.12 0.32 
>200 (%) 0.12 0.33  Private teacher (%) 0.03 0.17 
    Other (%) 0.04 0.20 
    No one (%) 0.09 0.28 
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Panel B (continued) 
 Mean St. Dev.    Mean St. Dev. 
    Blood donations 2.81 2.17 
Tenured teachers in the school 
(%) 
90.33 9.13  Average turnout at 
referenda (%) 
80.28 8.37 
Class average ESCS index -0.045 0.51  Provincial unemployment  
rate (2009) 
7.95 3.69 
Class size 16.93 4.64  Provincial per capita GDP 
(2009) 
23.84 5.60 
 
Panel C 
 Mean St. Dev.    Mean St. Dev. 
Math Test – V grade    Anxiety Questions   
Score 0.65 0.19  I was already anxious 
before starting the test 
0.61 0.49 
Within-class standard 
deviation 
0.14 0.04  I was so nervous I 
couldn’t find the answers 
0.19 0.39 
Within-class coefficient of 
variation 
0.23 0.09  While answering , I felt 
like I was doing badly 
0.50 0.50 
Within-class bottom quartile 0.55 0.14  While answering, 
I was calm 
0.53 0.50 
Within-class median 0.65 0.13     
Within-class top quartile 0.75 0.12  Absences from test (%) 0.11 0.10 
Within-class Herfindal Index 0.53 0.15     
    Maths Test – II grade    
Ranking based on Math 
scores 
9.82 5.84  
Score 
0.62 0.20 
    Italian Test – V grade   
Ranking based on Math 
grades given by teachers in 
the previous semester 
10.44 6.96  Score 0.70 0.18 
 Italian Test – II grade   
 Score 0.65 0.23 
 
Notes: The table reports the mean and standard deviation of the covariates included in the regressions (Panel A), the variables used in 
Section 7 (Panel B) and the dependent variables (Panel C). All numbers refer to the entire country. These statistics are based on 
individual, school and class level data. Except for the number of students enrolled in each class, the variables in Panel A have been 
categorized as dummy variables. Class size in Panel B refers to the number of students attending the test. Blood donations are the 
number of blood bags per 10,000 inhabitants in the province. Per capita GDP is measured in thousand euro. See the Appendix for 
further details.  
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Table 3 - Balancing Tests. First (between schools) and Second Stage (within schools) 
Randomization. - Math tests - V Graders. 
 
Panel A 
 Between 
schools 
Within 
schools 
  Between 
schools 
Within 
schools 
Private school (%) 0.003 .  Mother occupation   
Full time schedule (%) 0.015 0.011  Missing (%) -0.014 -0.024*** 
Number of students enrolled 
in class 
0.079 0.425***  Unemployed or retired 
(%) 
0.008 0.012*** 
Gender    Employee (%) 0.003 0.004 
Missing (%) 0.007*** 0.020***  Entrepreneur (%) 0.001 0.006** 
Male (%) -0.005** -0.004  Middle manager (%) 0.003 0.002 
Place of birth    Father occupation   
Missing (%) -0.014*** -0.027***  Missing (%) -0.014 -0.023*** 
Italy (%) 0.014*** 0.027***  Unemployed or retired 
(%) 
0.001 0.001 
Citizenship    Employee (%) 0.002 0.016*** 
Missing (%) -0.008*** -0.013***  Entrepreneur (%) 0.009* 0.005 
Italian (%) 0.008** 0.010***  Middle manager (%) 0.002 0.002 
First generation foreigner (%) -0.001 0.000  Mother education   
Second generation foreigner 
(%) 
0.001 0.002  Missing (%) -0.017 -0.028*** 
Pre-primary school    Primary (%) 0.008 0.019*** 
Missing (%) -0.027*** -0.009*  Secondary (%) 0.005 0.009** 
Yes (%) 0.027*** 0.010*  Tertiary (%) 0.004 0.000 
Age    Father education   
Missing (%) 0.007*** 0.018***  Missing (%) -0.018* -0.025*** 
Older than regular (%) 0.000 0.000  Primary (%) 0.013* 0.016*** 
Regular (%) -0.008*** -0.014***  Secondary (%) 0.001 0.008** 
Younger than regular (%) 0.002 -0.004**  Tertiary (%) 0.003 0.001 
Math grade in semester before 
the test 
   Mother nationality   
Missing (%) -0.021*** -0.009*  Missing (%) -0.018*** -0.014*** 
1-4 (%) 0.000 0.000*  Italian (%) 0.015*** 0.012** 
5 (%) 0.001 0.000  Father nationality   
6-7 (%) 0.010** 0.008*  Missing (%) -0.017*** -0.013*** 
8-10 (%) 0.011* 0.001  Italian (%) 0.015*** 0.009* 
Italian grade in semester 
before the test 
      
Missing (%) -0.021*** -0.008     
1-4 (%) 0.000 0.000     
5 (%) 0.000 0.001     
6-7 (%) 0.006 0.003     
8-10 (%) 0.014*** 0.004     
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Panel B (continued) 
 Between 
schools 
Within 
schools 
  Between 
schools 
Within 
schools 
Has own bedroom    Number of siblings   
Missing (%) -0.006** -0.009***  Missing (%) -0.007*** -0.009*** 
Yes (%) 0.000 0.004  0 (%) -0.001 0.000 
Has internet access    1 (%) 0.005* 0.008** 
Missing (%) -0.006** -0.008***  2 (%) 0.001 0.000 
Yes (%) 0.007** 0.008**  3 (%) 0.001 0.000 
Has an encyclopedia    4 or more (%) 0.001 0.001 
Missing (%) -0.006** -0.008***  Lives with   
Yes (%) 0.005 0.016***  Missing (%) -0.008*** -0.010*** 
Has own desk    Both parents (%) 0.008*** 0.007** 
Missing (%) -0.005** -0.008***  One parent only (%) -0.001 0.000 
Yes (%) 0.005* 0.009***  Both parents alternatively 
(%) 
0.000 0.002 
Has a PC    Others (%) 0.000 0.000 
Missing (%) -0.005** -0.008***  Language spoken at home   
Yes (%) 0.007** 0.011***  Missing (%) -0.008*** -0.009*** 
Has a place for homework    Italian (%) 0.004 0.007* 
Missing (%) -0.006** -0.008***  Dialect (%) 0.003 0.001 
Yes (%) 0.006** 0.008**  Other (%) 0.001 0.001 
Number of books at home    Help with homework   
Missing (%) -0.007*** -0.008***  Missing -0.008*** -0.006** 
0-10 (%) 0.000 0.001  No homework (%) -0.001** -0.001*** 
11-25 (%) -0.004 -0.001  No help needed (%) -0.001 0.005 
26-100 (%) 0.001 0.006*  Parents (%) 0.006* 0.001 
101-200 (%) 0.004** 0.003  Siblings (%) 0.003** -0.002 
>200 (%) 0.006*** -0.001  Private teacher (%) 0.000 0.002 
    Other (%) 0.002 -0.001 
    No one (%) -0.001 0.002 
Notes: the table shows the point estimates of the balancing tests between and within schools. We compute school or class averages of individual 
variables and test for balancing using regressions (1) and (2). Full time schedule refers to schools offering this option in the between schools analysis 
and to the schedule of the single class in the within school analysis. While variables in Panel A are available for students in both grades, variables in 
Panel B are only available for fifth grade students. Standard errors for the second stage are adjusted for clustering at the school level. One, two and 
three stars for statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level. 
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Table 4. The Effects of External Monitoring. Math Tests – V Grade. Dependent variable: 
Percentage of Correct Answers in the Class.  
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Italy North Centre South 
          
Direct Effect -2.79*** -0.99*** -2.27*** -4.92*** 
 (0.25) (0.28) (0.48) (0.50) 
Indirect Effect -0.81*** -0.70*** -0.73 -1.04* 
 (0.28) (0.27) (0.45) (0.61) 
Overall Effect -3.59*** -1.69*** -2.99*** -5.96*** 
 (0.29) (0.31) (0.54) (0.60) 
     
Observations 27,325 11,541 4,886 10,898 
R-squared 0.15 0.2 0.15 0.14 
Additional covariates  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Mean - Untreated Schools 65.1 63.9 64.0 66.8 
Notes: all regressions include the number of students enrolled in the class, regional dummies and regional dummies 
interacted with school size and with the number of fifth grade classes in the school. Additional covariates are shown in 
Table 2 - panel A. Estimates are weighted by class size. Standard errors adjusted for clustering at the school level in 
parentheses. One, two and three stars for statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level of confidence. 
 
 
Table 5. The Effects of External Monitoring on Student Psychological Conditions. Math Tests – V 
Grade. Dependent variable: Percentage of Positive Answers in the Class. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
I was already 
anxious before 
starting the test 
I was so 
nervous I 
couldn’t find 
the answers 
While 
answering , I 
felt like I was 
doing badly 
While 
answering, 
I was calm 
 
          
Direct Effect 0.25 -0.92*** -0.08 0.64 
 (0.42) (0.29) (0.39) (0.39) 
Indirect Effect 0.25 0.01 0.36 -0.01 
 (0.31) (0.21) (0.28) (0.29) 
Overall Effect 0.50 -0.90*** 0.28 0.63* 
 (0.41) (0.28) (0.38) (0.38) 
     
Observations 27,141 27,142 27,141 27,140 
R-squared 0.07 0.11 0.1 0.07 
Additional covariates  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Mean - Untreated Schools 61.0 19.2 50.7 53.1 
Notes: see Table 4. In each column, the dependent variable is the percentage of students in the class who agreed with 
the sentence reported at the top of the column. Students with missing answers have been dropped from the estimation 
sample (about 2 percent of the total). The estimates refer to the entire country. 
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Table 6. The Effects of External Monitoring on the Standard Deviation, the Coefficient of Variation 
and the Quartiles of the Distribution of Correct Answers within the Class. Math tests – V Grade. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Standard 
Deviation 
Coefficient 
of Variation 
Bottom 
quartile 
Median Top quartile 
            
Direct Effect 0.76*** 2.14*** -3.70*** -3.07*** -2.26*** 
 (0.09) (0.21) (0.31) (0.29) (0.27) 
Indirect Effect 0.03 0.30 -0.55* -0.56* -0.61** 
 (0.08) (0.18) (0.31) (0.29) (0.26) 
Overall Effect 0.79*** 2.44*** -4.26*** -3.63*** -2.88*** 
 (0.09) (0.22) (0.33) (0.32) (0.30) 
      
Observations 27,325 27,325 27,325 27,325 27,325 
R-squared 0.18 0.15 0.12 0.1 0.09 
Additional covariates  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
Mean - Untreated Schools 14.1 22.8 55.6 65.6 75.2 
Notes: see Table 4. The estimates refer to the entire country. 
 
 
Table 7. The Effects of External Monitoring on the Heterogeneity of Answers in each Class. Math 
Tests – V Grade. Dependent Variable: Average Herfindhal Index in Each Class x 100. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Italy North Centre South 
          
Direct Effect 3.93*** 1.24*** 2.63*** 7.32*** 
 (0.32) (0.32) (0.60) (0.64) 
Indirect Effect 0.82** 0.64** 0.51 1.22* 
 (0.34) (0.31) (0.58) (0.73) 
Overall Effect 4.75*** 1.88*** 3.14*** 8.54*** 
 (0.35) (0.35) (0.62) (0.719) 
     
Observations 27,325 11,541 4,886 10,898 
R-squared 0.2 0.17 0.13 0.15 
Additional covariates  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Mean - Untreated Schools 52.8 57.3 55.7 46.9 
Notes: see Table 4. 
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Table 8. Heterogeneous Effects of External Monitoring. Math Tests – V Grade. Dependent variable: 
Percentage of Correct Answers in the Class.  
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 
Interacted 
with Class 
Size 
Interacted 
with % 
Tenured 
Teachers 
Interacted 
with ESCS 
        
Direct Effect -3.41*** -1.34*** -2.65*** 
 (0.41) (0.29) (0.33) 
Interacted Direct Effect 0.98* -2.98*** -0.15 
 (0.53) (0.50) (0.54) 
Indirect Effect -0.94*** -0.66** -0.67** 
 (0.36) (0.29) (0.31) 
Interacted Indirect Effect 0.22 -0.19 -0.30 
 (0.41) (0.54) (0.44) 
Overall Effect -4.35*** -2.00*** -3.32*** 
 (0.43) (0.33) (0.36) 
Interacted Overall Effect 1.20** -3.17*** -0.45 
 (0.51) (0.57) (0.51) 
    
Observations 27,325 26,313 27,323 
R-squared 0.15 0.15 0.15 
Additional covariates  Yes Yes Yes 
    
Mean - Untreated Schools 65.1 64.9 65.1 
Notes: Interacted effects refer to the interactions between direct, indirect and overall effects and the variable listed at the top of each 
column. The interacting variable enters also as an independent covariate in the regression. Class size and the percentage of tenured 
teachers in the school are coded as dummy variables taking value one and zero when above and below the median. ESCS is coded as 
a dummy taking value one when below median and zero when above. The proportion of tenured teachers is not available for private 
schools (729 classes), for the public schools located in the Province of Trento (263 classes) and for five Sicilian public schools who 
did not transmit the information (20 classes). Average ESCS is not available for 2 classes. All regressions include the number of 
students enrolled in the class, regional dummies and regional dummies interacted with school size and with the number of fifth grade 
classes in the school. Estimates are weighted by class size. Standard errors adjusted for clustering at the school level in parentheses. 
One, two and three stars for statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level of confidence. 
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Table 9. Interacting External Monitoring with Measures of Social Capital. Math Tests – V Grade. 
Dependent variable: Percentage of Correct Answers in the Class  
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Baseline  
Interacted 
with Blood 
Donations 
Interacted with 
Blood Donations 
and Macro 
Variables 
Interacted 
with 
Turnover at 
Referenda  
Interacted with 
Turnover at 
Referenda and 
Macro Variables 
            
Direct Effect -2.78*** -2.48*** -2.64*** -2.63*** -2.69*** 
 (0.25) (0.24) (0.26) (0.24) (0.25) 
Interacted Direct Effect  0.81*** 0.41*** 0.25*** 0.14** 
  (0.11) (0.12) (0.04) (0.06) 
Indirect Effect -0.82*** -0.85*** -0.93*** -0.80*** -0.88*** 
 (0.28) (0.26) (0.29) (0.26) (0.20) 
Interacted Indirect Effect  -0.06 -0.13 0.01 -0.02 
  (0.12) (0.13) (0.04) (0.07) 
Overall Effect -3.60*** -3.33*** -3.57*** -3.43*** -3.57** 
 (0.30) (0.28) (0.31) (0.28) (0.30) 
Interacted Overall Effect  0.75*** 0.28** 0.26*** 0.12* 
  (0.13) (0.14) (0.04) (0.07) 
      
Observations 27,178 27,178 27,178 27,178 27,178 
R-squared 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 
Additional covariates  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
Mean - Untreated Schools 65.1 65.1 65.1 65.1 65.1 
Notes: Interacted effects are the interactions between direct, indirect and overall effects and the variables listed at the top of each 
column. These variables enter as deviations from their sample means both in the interaction term and as an independent covariates in 
the regression. Social capital measures are not available for the provinces of Belluno and Isernia (147 classes). Macro variables: Per 
capita GDP and the unemployment rate in the province. All regressions include the number of students enrolled in the class, regional 
dummies and regional dummies interacted with school size and with the number of fifth grade classes in the school. Additional 
covariates are shown in Table 2 – panel A. Estimates are weighted by class size. Standard errors adjusted for clustering at the school 
level in parentheses. One, two and three stars for statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level of confidence. 
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Figure 1. Geographical Distribution of Blood Donations, Average Turnout at Referenda, the 
Unemployment Rate and GDP per capita in the Italian Provinces. 
 
 
 
a.       b.  
 
 
c.       d.  
 
Notes: Panel a): number of blood donations per 10,000 inhabitants in 1995. Panel b): average turnover at the referenda 
that took place between 1946 and 1989. Panel c): unemployment rate in 2009. Panel d) GDP per capita in 2009. The 
data are ordered by quintiles, with darker colours referring to the top quintile of the distribution. 
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Appendix  
 
1. Tables 
 
Table A.1. The Effects of External Monitoring. Italian Tests – V Grade. Dependent variable: 
Percentage of Correct Answers in the Class.  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Italy North Centre South 
          
Direct Effect  -2.61*** -1.03*** -2.17*** -4.39*** 
 (0.20) (0.21) (0.42) (0.39) 
Indirect Effect -0.67*** -0.38* -0.81** -0.99** 
 (0.21) (0.21) (0.35) (0.46) 
Overall Effect -3.28*** -1.41*** -2.98*** -5.37*** 
 (0.23) (0.22) (0.45) (0.45) 
     
Observations 27,369 11,557 4,894 10,918 
R-squared 0.19 0.28 0.22 0.17 
Additional covariates  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Mean - Untreated Schools 70.0 70.2 70.1 69.7 
Notes: see Table 4. 
 
 
 
Table A.2. The Effects of External Monitoring. Math Tests – II Grade. Dependent variable: 
Percentage of Correct Answers in the Class.  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Italy North Centre South 
          
Direct Effect -4.20*** -1.57*** -3.09*** -7.50*** 
 (0.29) (0.32) (0.54) (0.58) 
Indirect Effect -1.22*** -0.91*** -1.37** -1.53** 
 (0.33) (0.34) (0.60) (0.74) 
Overall Effect -5.42*** -2.48*** -4.47*** -9.03*** 
 (0.34) (0.36) (0.58) (0.69) 
     
Observations 27,012 11,724 4,905 10,383 
R-squared 0.11 0.08 0.09 0.08 
Additional covariates  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Mean - Untreated Schools 62.9 59.9 61.8 66.7 
Notes: see Table 4. 
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Table A.3. The Effects of External Monitoring. Italian Tests – II Grade. Dependent variable: 
Percentage of Correct Answers in the Class.  
 
  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Italy North Centre South 
          
Direct Effect x 100 -3.40*** -1.36*** -2.17*** -6.21*** 
 (0.28) (0.34) (0.51) (0.54) 
Indirect Effect x 100 -1.04*** -0.71** -1.25** -1.33** 
 (0.28) (0.31) (0.53) (0.62) 
Overall Effect x 100 -4.44*** -2.07*** -3.42 -7.54*** 
 (0.29) (0.34) (0.56) (0.58) 
     
Observations 27,025 11,721 4,911 10,393 
R-squared 0.13 0.2 0.16 0.11 
Additional covariates  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Mean - Untreated Schools 65.9 65.0 66.2 66.7 
Notes: see Table 4. 
 
 
 
Table A.4. GLM estimates of the Effects of External Monitoring. Math Tests – V Grade. Dependent 
variable: Percentage of Correct Answers in the Class.  
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Italy North Centre South 
          
Direct Effect -2.74*** -0.97*** -2.25*** -4.73*** 
 (0.25) (0.28) (0.47) (0.48) 
Indirect Effect -0.80*** -0.70*** -0.72 -1.04* 
 (0.28) (0.27) (0.45) (0.60) 
Overall Effect -3.54*** -1.67*** -2.97*** -5.77*** 
 (0.29) (0.30) (0.53) (0.57) 
     
Observations 27,325 11,541 4,886 10,898 
Additional covariates  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Mean - Untreated Schools 65.1 63.9 64.0 66.8 
Notes: see Table 4.  
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Table A.5. The Effects of External Monitoring. Math Tests – V Grade. Dependent variable: 
Percentage of Correct Answers in the Class. Finite Population Correction. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Italy North Centre South 
          
Direct Effect -2.89*** -1.08*** -2.35*** -5.05*** 
 (0.12) (0.14) (0.23) (0.24) 
Indirect Effect -0.83*** -0.71*** -0.70*** -1.06*** 
 (0.13) (0.13) (0.21) (0.27) 
Overall Effect -3.72*** -1.79*** -3.05*** -6.11*** 
 (0.14) (0.14) (0.25) (0.28) 
     
Observations 27,325 11,541 4,886 10,898 
R-squared 0.15 0.19 0.15 0.15 
Additional covariates  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Mean - Untreated Schools 65.1 63.9 64.0 66.8 
Notes: see Table 4. 
 
 
 
Table A.6. The Effects of External Monitoring. Math Tests – V Grade. Dependent variable: 
Percentage of Correct Answers in the Class. Without Covariates. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Italy North Centre South 
          
Direct Effect -2.82*** -0.85*** -2.04*** -5.29*** 
 (0.26) (0.30) (0.49) (0.52) 
Indirect Effect -0.70** -0.82*** -0.46 -0.70 
 (0.30) (0.31) (0.51) (0.65) 
Overall Effect -3.52*** -1.68*** -2.50*** -5.99*** 
 (0.31) (0.34) (0.58) (0.64) 
     
Observations 27,325 11,541 4,886 10,898 
R-squared 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.03 
Additional covariates  No No No No 
     
Mean - Untreated Schools 65.1 63.9 64.0 66.8 
Notes: see Table 4. Each regression includes the number of students enrolled in the class, regional dummies and 
regional dummies interacted with school size and with the number of fifth grade classes in the school. 
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Table A.7. The Effects of External Monitoring. Math Tests – V grade. Dependent variable: 
Percentage Absent from the Test 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Italy North Centre South 
          
Direct Effect -0.53** -0.50 -0.47 -0.55 
 (0.24) (0.40) (0.47) (0.40) 
Indirect Effect -0.10 0.44 -0.44 -0.51 
 (0.24) (0.36) (0.42) (0.44) 
Overall Effect -0.63** -0.06 -0.91** -1.06** 
 (0.25) (0.40) (0.46) (0.42) 
     
Observations 27,325 11,541 4,886 10,898 
R-squared 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03 
Additional covariates  No No No No 
     
Mean - Untreated Schools 11.0 10.4 11.7 11.4 
Notes: see Table 4. The only covariates still included in the models are the number of students enrolled in the class, 
regional dummies and regional dummies interacted with school size and with the number of fifth grade classes in the 
school. 
 
2. External examiners. 
 
External examiners are selected by the regional education offices using criteria defined at the 
national level, from a pool of potential candidates composed by teachers and school principals, 
most of them retired. Eligible candidates must have personal characteristics that facilitate a fair 
collaboration with the school principal and the teachers involved in the test, should have a good 
knowledge of the evaluation procedure and should be familiar with the software and the procedure 
to transmit data to INVALSI.  
     Eligibility requires that examiners did not work during the two years before the test in the same 
municipality or in the same school they are going to supervise. If they are still active as teachers, 
they must be employed in a non-primary school. INVALSI conducted some investigation about 
possible cases of collusion between external examiners and school principals or teachers and did 
not find evidence of misconduct.  Once appointed, external examiners need to coordinate with the 
school principal to prepare for the test. External examiners generally worked for two days and 
earned 200 euro per working day. 
 
3. Sampling procedure. 
 
The sampling procedure is a two-stage design and was taken from the IEA TIMMS survey, which 
INVALSI manages for Italy. Sampling takes place separately in each region. In the first stage, a 
pre-specified number of schools was randomly drawn from the population of schools located in the 
 32 
region. Schools with less than 10 students were excluded from the population and the rest were 
listed in a spreadsheet with the corresponding number of enrolled students in the second and fifth 
grades, which is the relevant measure of school size. The sampling method adopted is a PPS – 
probability proportional to size: the probability that each school is randomly sampled is 
proportional to school size. Practically, a software randomly samples schools from the sampling 
frame.
26
 Only 5 schools have been replaced from the original sample. This low replacement rate is 
due to the fact that participation and compliance with INVALSI procedures are compulsory because 
of the law.  The second stage of the sampling procedure is a simple random sampling of classes 
within the sampled schools. One or two classes per grade, depending uniquely on school size, were 
randomly selected from each sampled school. No negotiation between school principals and 
INVALSI occurred to determine the selected classes. 
     The PPS technique implies that larger schools have a higher probability of being sampled than 
smaller schools. However, this difference in the selection probabilities is largely offset at the second 
stage of sampling by selecting a fixed number of classes with equal probability from the sampled 
school. Classes in large schools with many classes in the target grade have a lower probability of 
selection than classes in smaller schools that have just one or two classes.  
 
4. From the initial dataset to the final sample  
 
Our data are drawn from the 2010 wave of the INVALSI SNV survey of educational achievements 
in Italian primary schools. These data are freely available from INVALSI. In this section of the 
Appendix we briefly describe our handling of the data.  
1) We exclude Valle d’Aosta and the Province of Bolzano, because all classes in these 
areas were assigned to external monitoring.  
2) We drop schools where there is a different number of second and fifth grade classes 
assigned to monitoring, because this outcome is inconsistent with the sampling scheme.  
3) We drop classes with less than five students and schools with a single class per grade or 
with two classes if both were assigned to monitoring.  
     To illustrate the effects of these actions, we consider the Math test for fifth graders. For this 
group, the population consists of 7,700 schools, 30,476 classes and 565,064 students. Our initial 
dataset includes 7,541 schools, 29,811 classes and 491,421 non-disabled students in schools with 
more than ten students (smaller schools are excluded from testing) who were present during the 
                                                        
26
 Additional details on the  sampling of schools can be found at the IEA TIMSS and PIRLS 2011 
webpage http://timssandpirls.bc.edu/methods/pdf/TP_Sampling_Design.pdf 
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testing day. Dropping data for the provinces of Aosta and Bolzano reduces the total number of 
schools to 7,502, with 29,647 classes and 489,396 students. Elimination of treated schools where 
there is a different number of second and fifth grade classes leaves us with 489,126 students 
allocated in 29,629 classes of 7,498 schools. Purging out classes with less than 5 students leaves us 
with 28,677 classes in 7,452 schools and a total of 486,531 students. After dropping schools with a 
single class in the grade or with two classes if both are treated we obtain our estimation sample, 
which consists of 6,108 schools, 27,325 classes and 462,570 students.  
      
5. Other data 
 
Unemployment and per capita GDP data refer to year 2009 and are drawn from EUROSTAT 
regional statistics database. Data on blood donations and the average turnout at referenda are from 
Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2004). The original data have been re-classified to match INVALSI 
classification, which includes 103 provinces  
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